Note accompanying His Holiness' letters to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin dated September 11, 1992
On June 22, 1992, Mr. Ding Guangen, head of the United Front Works Department of CCP Central Committee, met with
Mr. Gyalo Thondup in Beijing and restated the assurance given by Mr. Deng Xiaoping to Mr. Gyalo Thondup in 1979
that the Chinese government was willing to discuss and any issue with us except total independence. Mr. Ding
Guangen also said that, in the government's view, "the Dalai Lama is continuing with independence activities," but
the Chinese government was willing to immediately start negotiations as soon as I give up the independence of
Tibet. This position, repeatedly stated in the past by the Chinese government, shows that the Chinese leadership
still does not understand my ideas regarding the Tibetan-Chinese relationship. Therefore, I take this opportunity
to clarify my position through this note.
- It is an established fact that Tibet and China existed as separate countries in the past. However,
as a result of misrepresentations of Tibet' s unique relations with the Mongol and the Manchu Emperors.
disputes arose between Tibet and the Kuomintang and the present Chinese government. The fact that the
Chinese government found it necessary to conclude a "17-Point Agreement" with the Tibetan government in
1951 clearly shows the Chinese government's acknowledgement of Tibet's unique position.
- When I visited Beijing in 1954, I had the impression that most of the Communist party leaders I met
there were honest, straightforward and open minded. Chairman Mao Zedong, in particular, told me on
several occasions that the Chinese were in Tibet only to help Tibet harness its natural resources and
use them for the development of the country; General Zhang Jingwu and General Fan Ming, were in Tibet
to help me and the people of Tibet, and not to rule the Tibetan government and people. and that all
Chinese officials in Tibet were there to help us and to be withdrawn when Tibet had progressed. Any
Chinese official who did not act accordingly! would be sent back to China. Chairman Mao went on to say
that it had now been decided to establish a "Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Tibet
Autonomous Region" instead of the earlier plan to put Tibet under the direct control of the Chinese
government through a "Military-Political Commission." At my last meeting with Chairman Mao, before I
left China. he gave me a long explanation about democracy. He said that I must provide leadership and
advised me on how to keep in touch with the views of the people. He spoke in a gentle and compassionate
manner which was moving and inspiring.
While in Beijing, I told Premier Zhou Enlai that we Tibetans were fully aware of our need to develop
politically, socially and economically and that in fact I had already taken steps towards this.
On my way back to Tibet, I told General Zhang Guohua that I had gone to China with doubts and anxiety
about the future of my people and country, but had now returned with great hope and optimism and a very
positive impression of the Chinese leaders. My innate desire to serve my people, especially the poor
and the weak, and the prospect of mutual cooperation and friendship between Tibet and China made me
feel hopeful and optimistic about Tibet's future development. This was how I felt at that time about
the Tibetan-Chinese relationship.
- When the "Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee" was setup in Lhasa in 1956, there was no
alternative but to work sincerely with it for the interest and benefit of both parties. However, by
then the Chinese authorities had already started to use unthinkable brutal force to impose Communism on
the Tibetan people of the Kham and Amdo areas, particularly in Lithang. This increased the resentment
of the Tibetans against Chinese policies, leading to open resistance.
I could not believe that Chairman Mao would have approved of such repressive policy because of the
promises he had made to me when I was in China. I, therefore, wrote three letters to him explaining the
situation and seeking an end to the repression. Regrettably, there was no reply to my letters.
In late 1956, I visited India to attend Buddha Jayanti, the anniversary of the birth of Buddha. At that
time, many Tibetans advised me not to return to Tibet, and to continue talks with China from India. I
also felt that I should stay in India for the time being.
While in India, I met Premier Zhou Enlai and told him how deeply saddened I was by the military
repression inflicted upon Tibetans in Kham and Amdo in the name of "reforms." Premier Zhou Enlai said
that he regarded these matters as mistakes committed by Chinese officials and that "reforms" in Tibet
would be carried out only in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan people, and that in fact the
Chinese government had already decided to postpone the "reforms" in Tibet by six years. He then urged
me to return to Tibet as soon as possible in order to prevent further outbreaks of unrest.
According to the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, Premier Zhou Enlai told him that the Chinese
government "did not consider Tibet as a province of China. The people were different from the people of
China proper. Therefore, they (the Chinese) considered Tibet as an autonomous region which could enjoy
autonomy." Prime Minister Nehru told me that he had assurances from Premier Zhou Enlai that Tibet's
autonomy would be respected and, therefore, advised me to make efforts to safeguard it and cooperate
with China in bringing about reforms. By then, the situation in Tibet had become extremely dangerous
and desperate. Nevertheless, I decided to return to Tibet to give the Chinese government another
opportunity to be able to implement their promises. On my return to Lhasa through Dromo, Gyangtse and
Shigatse I had many meetings with Tibetan and Chinese officials; I told them that the Chinese were not
in Tibet to rule the Tibetans, that the Tibetans were not subjects of China, and that since the Chinese
leaders had promised to establish Tibet as an autonomous region with full internal freedoms, we all had
to work to make it succeed. I emphasised the point that the leaders of China had assured me that all
Chinese personnel in Tibet were there to help us, and that if they behaved otherwise, they would be
going against the order of their own government. I believe, I was once again doing my best to promote
cooperation between Tibet and China.
- However, because of the harsh military repression in the Kham and Amdo parts of eastern Tibet,
thousands of young and old Tibetans unable to live under such circumstances began to arrive in Lhasa as
refugees. As a result of these Chinese actions the Tibetan people felt great anxiety and began to lose
faith in the promises made by China. This led to greater resentment and a worsening of the situation.
Nevertheless, I continued to counsel my people to seek a peaceful solution and to show restraint. At
the risk of losing the trust of the Tibetan people I did my best to prevent a break-down of the
communications with the Chinese officials in Lhasa. But the situation continued to deteriorate and
finally exploded in the tragic events of 1959, which forced me to leave Tibet. Faced with such a
desperate situation. I had no alternative but to appeal lo the United Nations. The United Nations, in
turn, passed three resolutions on Tibet in 1959, 1961 and 1965, wherein it called for the cessation of
practices which deprived Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms including their
right to self- determination" and asked member States to make all possible efforts toward achieving
that purpose.
The Chinese government did not respect the United Nations resolutions. In the meantime, the Cultural
Revolution started and there was absolutely no opportunity for solving the Tibetan-Chinese problems. It
was, in fact, not even possible to identify a leader with whom we could talk.
- Inspite of my unfulfilled hopes and disappointments in dealing with the Chinese government, and
since Tibet and China, will always remain as neighbours, I am convinced that we must strive to find a
way to co-exist in peace and help each other. This, I believe, is possible and worthy of our efforts.
With this conviction I said in my statement to the Tibetan people on March 10, 1971: "Inspite of the
fact that we Tibetans have to oppose Communist China, I can never bring myself to hate her people.
Hatred is not a sign of strength, but of weakness. When Lord Buddha said that hatred cannot be overcome
by hatred, he was not only being spiritual. But His words reflect the practical reality of life. What
ever one achieves through hatred will not last long. On the other hand, hatred will only generate more
problems. And for the Tibetan people who are faced with such a tragic situation, hatred will only bring
additional depression. Moreover, how can we hate a people who do not know what they are doing? How can
we hate millions of Chinese, who have no power and are helplessly led by their leaders? We cannot even
hate the Chinese leaders for they have suffered tremendously for their nation and the cause which they
believe to be right. I do not believe in hatred, but I do believe, as I have always done, that one day
truth and justice will triumph."
In my March 10th statement of 1973, referring to the Chinese claim of Tibetans being made the "masters
of the country" after being "liberated from the three big feudal lords" and enjoying "unprecedented
progress and happiness," I stated: "The aim of the struggle of the Tibetans outside Tibet is the
attainment of the happiness of the Tibetan people. If the Tibetans in Tibet are truly happy under
Chinese rule then there is no reason for us here in exile to argue otherwise."
Again. in my 1979 March 10th statement, I welcomed Mr. Deng Xiaoping's statement "to seek truth from
facts", to give the Chinese people their long cherished rights, and of the need to acknowledge one's
own mistakes and shortcomings. While commending these signs of honesty, progress and openness, I said:
"The present Chinese leaders should give up the past dogmatic narrow-mindedness and fear of losing face
and recognise the present world situation. They should accept their mistakes, the realities, and the
right of all peoples of the human race to equality and happiness. Acceptance of this should not be
merely on paper; it should be put into practice. If these are accepted and strictly followed, all
problems can be solved with honesty and justice." With this conviction I renewed my efforts to promote
reconciliation and friendship between China and Tibet.
- In 1979, Mr. Deng Xiaoping invited Mr. Gyalo Thondup to Beijing and told him that apart from the
question of total independence all other issues could be discussed and all problems can be resolved.
Mr. Deng further told Mr.Thondup that we must keep in contact with each other and that we could send
fact-finding delegations to Tibet. This naturally gave us great hopes of resolving our problem
peacefully and we started sending delegations to Tibet.
On March 13, 1981, I sent a letter to Mr. Deng Xiaoping, in which I said:
"The three fact-finding delegations have been able to find out both the positive and negative aspects
of the situation in Tibet. If the Tibetan people's identity is preserved and if they are genuinely
happy, there is no reason to complain. However, in reality over 90% of the Tibetans are suffering both
mentally and physically, and are living in deep sorrow. These sad conditions had not been brought about
by natural disasters, but by human actions. Therefore, genuine efforts must be made to solve the
problem in accordance with the existing realities in a reasonable way.
In order to do this, we must improve the relationship between China and Tibet as well as between
Tibetans in and outside Tibet. With truth and equality as our foundation, we must try to develop
friendship between Tibetans and Chinese in future through better understanding. Time has come to apply
our common wisdom in a spirit of tolerance and broad-mindedness to achieve genuine happiness for the
Tibetan people with a sense of urgency. On my part, I remain committed to contribute to the welfare of
all human beings and in particular the poor and the weak to the best of my ability without making any
distinction based on national boundaries.
I hope you will let me know your views on the foregoing points."
There was no reply to my letter Instead, on July 28, 1981, General Secretary Hu Yaobang gave Mr. Gyalo
Thondup a document, entitled "Five point Policy Towards the Dalai Lama". This was a surprise and a
great disappointment. The reason for our consistent efforts to deal with the Chinese government is to
achieve lasting and genuine happiness for six million Tibetans who must live as neighbours of China
from generation to generation. However, the Chinese leadership chose tc ignore this and, instead,
attempted to reduce the whole issue to that of my personal status and the conditions for my return
without any willingness to address the real underlying issues.
Nevertheless, I continued to place hope in Mr. Deng Xiaoping's statement "seeking truth from facts" and
his policy of liberalisation. Therefore, I sent several delegations to Tibet and China and wherever
there was an opportunity we explained our views to promote under standing through discussion and
dialogue. As initially suggested by Mr. Deng Xiaoping I agreed to send Tibetan teachers from India to
improve the education of Tibetans in Tibet. But for one reason or the other the Chinese government did
not accept this.
These contacts resulted in four fact finding delegations to Tibet, two delegations to Beijing, and the
start of family visitations between the Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. However, these steps did not
lead to any substantial progress in resolving the problems between us owing to the rigidity of the
Chinese leaders' positions which, I believe, failed to reflect Mr. Deng Xiaoping's policies.
- Once again, I did not give up hope. This was reflected in my annual March 10th statements to the
Tibetan people in 1981, 1983, 1984 and 1985, wherein I said the following:
"... past history has disappeared in the past. What is more relevant is that in the future there
actually must be real peace and happiness through developing friendly and meaningful relations between
China and Tibet. For this to be realised, it is important for both sides to work hard to have tolerant
understanding and be open-minded." (1981)
"The right to express one's ideas and to make every effort to implement them enables people everywhere
to become creative and progressive. This engenders human society to make rapid progress and experience
genuine harmony.... The deprivation of freedom to express one's views, either by force or by other
means, is absolutely anachronistic and a brutal form of oppression.... The people of the world will not
only oppose it, but will condemn it. Hence, the six million Tibetan people must have the right to
preserve, and enhance their cultural identity and religious freedom, the right to determine their own
destiny and manage their own affairs, and find fulfillment of their free self-expression, without
interference from any quarters. This is reasonable and just." (1983).
"Irrespective of varying degrees of development- and economic disparities, continents, nations,
communities, families, in fact, all individuals are dependent on one another for their existence and
well-beings. Every human being wishes for happiness and does not want suffering. By clearly realising
this, we must develop mutual compassion, love, and a fundamental sense of justice. In such an
atmosphere there is hope that problems between nations and problems within families can be gradually
over come and that people can live in peace and harmony. Instead, if people adopt an attitude of
selfishness, domination and jealousy, the world at large, as well as individuals, will never enjoy
peace and harmony. Therefore, I believe that human relations based on mutual compassion and love is
fundamentally important to human happiness." (1984)
" ... in order to achieve genuine happiness in any human society, freedom of thought is extremely
important. This freedom of thought can only be achieved from mutual trust, mutual understanding and the
absence of fear.... In the case of Tibet and China too, unless we can remove the state of mutual fear
and mistrust, unless we can develop a genuine sense of friendship and goodwill the problems that we
face today will continue to exist.
It is important for both of us to learn about one another.... It is now for the Chinese to act
according to the enlightened ideals and principles of the modern times; to come forward with an open
mind and make a serious attempt to know and understand the Tibetan people's view point and their true
feelings and aspirations.... It is wrong to react with suspicion or offence to the opinions that are
contrary to one's own way of thinking. It is essential that differences of opinion be examined and
discussed openly. When differing viewpoints are frankly stated and sensibly discussed on an equal
footing, the decisions or agreements reached as a result will be genuine and beneficial to all
concerned. But so long as there is a contradiction between thought and action, there can never be
genuine and meaningful agreements.
So, at this time, I feel the most important thing for us is to keep in close contact, to express our
views frankly and to make sincere efforts to understand each other. And, through eventual improvement
in-human relationship, I am confident that our problems can be solved to our mutual satisfaction."
(1985)
In these and other ways I expressed my views clearly. But, there was no reciprocity to my conciliatory
approaches.
- Since all the exchanges between Tibetans and Chinese yielded no results, I felt compelled to make
public my views on the steps necessary for an agreeable solution to the fundamental issues. On
September 21,1987, I announced a Five Point Peace Plan in the United States of America. In its
introduction, I said that in the hope of real reconciliation and a lasting solution to the problem, it
was my desire to take the first step with this initiative. This plan, I hoped, would in the future
contribute to the friendship and cooperation among all the neighbouring countries including the Chinese
people for their good and benefit. The basic elements were:
Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of ahimsa (peace and non-violence);
Abandonment of China's population. transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans
as a people; Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;
Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet
for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; Commencement of earnest
negotiations on the future status of Tibet and relations between the Tibetan and the Chinese peoples.
As a response to this initiative, Mr. Yang Mingfu, met Mr. Gyalo Thondup on October 17, 1987 and
delivered a message containing five points criticising me for my above peace initiative and accusing me
of having instigated the demonstrations in Lhasa of September 27, 1987 and of having worked against the
interests of Tibetan people.
This response, far from giving a serious thought to my sincere proposal for reconciliation, was
disappointing and demeaning.
Despite this, I tried once again to clarify our views in a detailed 14-point response on December 17,
1987.
- On June l5, 1988, at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, I once again elaborated on the Five-
Point Peace Plan. I proposed as a framework for negotiations to secure the basic rights of the Tibetan
people, China could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy and maintain a restricted number of
military installations in Tibet for defence until a regional peace conference is convened and Tibet is
transformed into a neutral peace sanctuary. I was criticised by many Tibetans for this proposal. My
idea was, to make it possible for China and Tibet to stay together in lasting friendship and to secure
the right for Tibetans to govern their own country. I sincerely believe that in the future a
demilitarised Tibet as a zone of ahimsa will contribute to harmony and peace not only between Tibetans
and Chinese. but to all the neighbouring countries and the entire region.
- On September 23, 1988, the Chinese government issued a statement that China was willing to begin
negotiations with us. The announcement stated that the date and venue for the negotiations would be
left to the Dalai Lama. We welcomed this announcement from Beijing and responded on October 25, 1988,
proposing January 1989 as the time and Geneva, an internationally recognized neutral venue, as our
choices. We announced that we had a negotiating team ready and named the members of the team.
The Chinese government responded on November 18,1988, rejecting Geneva and expressing preference for
Beijing or else Hong Kong, as the venue. They further stated that my negotiating team could not include
"a foreigner" and consist only of "younger people," and that it should have older people, including Mr.
Gyalo Thondup: We explained that the foreigner was only a legal advisor and not an actual member of the
negotiating team and that Mr. Gyalo Thondup would also be included as an advisor to the team.
With a flexible and open attitude we accommodated the Chinese government's requests and agreed to send
representatives to Hong Kong to hold preliminary meetings with representatives of the Chinese
government. Unfortunately, when both sides had finally agreed on Hong Kong as the site for preliminary
discussions the Chinese government refused to communicate any further and failed to live up to their
own suggestion.
- Although I championed this proposal for over two years there was no evidence of consideration or
even an acknowledgement from the Chinese government.
Therefore, in my March l0th statement in 1991, I was compelled to state that unless the Chinese
government responded in the near future I would consider myself free from any obligation to abide by
the proposal I made in France.
Since there appears to be no benefit from the many solutions I had advocated concerning Tibet and
China, I had to find a new way. Therefore, in a speech at Yale University on October 9, 1991, I said:
" ... I am considering the possibility of a visit to Tibet as early as possible. I have in mind two
purposes for such a visit.
First, I want to ascertain the situation in Tibet myself on the spot and communicate directly with my
people. By doing so, I also hope to help the Chinese leadership to understand the true feelings of
Tibetans. It would be important, therefore, for senior Chinese leaders to accompany me on such a visit,
and that outside observers, including the press be present to see and report their findings.
Second, I wish to advise and persuade my people not to abandon non-violence as the appropriate form of
struggle. My ability to talk to my our people can be a key factor in bringing about a peaceful
solution. My visit could be a new opportunity to promote understanding and create a basis for a
negotiated solution."
Unfortunately this overture was immediately opposed by the Chinese Government. At that time, I was
asked on many occasions by the press whether I was renewing the call for Tibetan independence since I
had declared that the Strasbourg proposal was no longer valid. To these questions, I stated that I did
not want to comment.
- The Chinese government has, with great doubt and suspicion, described our struggle as a movement to
restore the "old society" and that it was not in the interest of the Tibetan people but for the
personal status and interest of the Dalai Lama.
Since my youth, I was aware of the many faults of the existing system in Tibet and wanted to improve
it. At that time I started the process of reform in Tibet. Soon after our flight to India we introduced
democracy in our exile community, step by step. I repeatedly urged my people to follow this path. As a
result, our exiled community now implements a system in full accordance with universal democratic
principles.
It is impossible for Tibet to ever revert to the old system of government. Whether my efforts for the
Tibetan cause are as charged by the Chinese for my personal position and benefit or not is clear from
my repeated statements that in a future Tibet, I will not assume any governmental responsibility or
hold any political position. Furthermore,this is reflected clearly in the Charter which governs the
Tibetan Administration in Exile and in the "Guidelines for Future Tibet's Polity and the Basic Features
of Its Constitution," which I announced on February 26, 1992.
In the conclusion of these guideline, I suggested that Tibet shall not be influenced or swayed by the
policies and ideologies of other countries but remain a neutral state in the true sense of the term.
It shall maintain a harmonious relationship with its neighbours on equal terms and for mutual benefits.
It shall of hostility and enmity.
Similarly, in my statement of March 10th, 1992, I stated, "When a genuinely cordial relationship is
established between the Tibetans and the Chinese, it will enable us not only to resolve the disputes
between our two nations in this century, but will also enable the Tibetans to make a significant
contribution through our rich cultural tradition for mental peace among the millions of young Chinese".
My endeavours to establish a personal relationship with Chinese leaders include my offer, presented
through your Embassy in New Delhi in the latter part of 1980, for a meeting with General Secretary Hu
Yaobang during one of his visits abroad at any convenient place. Again in December 1991, when Premier
Li Peng visited New Delhi, I proposed to meet him there. These overtures were to no avail.
- An impartial review of the above points will clearly show that my ideas and successive efforts have
consistently sought solutions that will allow Tibet and China to live together in peace. In the light
of these facts it is difficult to understand the purpose of the Chinese government's position that Mr.
Deng Xiaoping's statement on Tibet of 1979 still stands and that as soon as "the Dalai Lama gives up
his splittist activities," negotiations could start. This position has been repeated over and over
again with no specific responses to my many initiatives.
If China wants Tibet to stay with China, then China must create the necessary conditions for this. The
time has come now for the Chinese to show the way for Tibet and China to live together in friendship. A
detailed step by step outline regarding Tibet's basic status should be spelt out. If such a clear
outline is given, regardless of the possibility of an agreement or not, we Tibetans can then make a
decision whether to live with China or not. If we Tibetans obtain our basic rights to our satisfaction
then we are not incapable of seeing the possible advantages of living with the Chinese.
I trust in the far sightedness and wisdom of China's leaders and hope that they will take into
consideration the current global political changes and the need to resolve the Tibetan problem
peacefully, promoting genuine lasting friendship between our two neighbouring peoples.
* Translated from the original Tibetan
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